



TELEGRAM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KABUL 468

LIMDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652; GDS
TAGS: AF, PFOR, OGEN
SUBJ: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT - 1977

REFS: A) 11 FAM 212.4; B) 76 KABUL 1765; C) KABUL A-6;
D) U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN (JULY 15, 1976)

SUMMARY: THERE IS A BROAD CONSENSUS IN THE U.S. MISSION IN KABUL THAT AMERICAN OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN, CRAFTED AND TESTED OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, ARE VALID. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DEA, PRESENT AND PLANNED U.S. RESOURCE INPUTS (STAFF AND MONEY) ARE AT APPROPRIATE, EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE LEVELS TO FULFILL THESE OBJECTIVES.

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME ROUGH SPOTS, THERE HAS BEEN NOTABLE AND MEASURABLE PROGRESS IN THE ATTAINMENT OF U.S. AIMS HERE OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS.

THE LOWERED EMOTIONAL TEMPERATURE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN OVER THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE IS ESPECIALLY GOOD NEWS
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FOR THE REGION, AND WE WELCOME IT

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THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LOCAL ADHERENTS MAY HAVE LOST SOME OF THEIR POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE HERE BUT, AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, MOSCOW DOES NOT FEEL LOSSES TO ANY EXTENT WHICH WOULD CREATE SOVIET SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BE THREATENING THE USSR'S VITAL INTERESTS. AFGHAN SUPPORTERS OF THE SOVIET CAUSE ARE VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INFLUENCE.

THE INCREASED INTEREST OF PRESIDENT DAUD AND HIS GOVT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) IN COMBATTING NARCOTIC PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING. THIS WELCOME DEVELOPMENT IS BEING FOLLOWED UP BY DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED ACTION PROGRAMS IN KABUL AND WASHINGTON.

ALTHOUGH OUR AID STRATEGY HAS RESULTED IN THE INITIATION OF A NUMBER OF NEW PROJECTS WHICH DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE POOR MAJORITY, SOME REVISION OF THAT STRATEGY IS REQUIRED IN 1977 TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF LESSONS LEARNED IN 1975 AND 1976.

THE SIGNING BY THE GOA WITH AN AMERICAN FIRM OF A FIFTY MILLION DOLLAR (IRANIAN AID) CONTRACT FOR A CEMENT PLANT WAS A MAJOR COMMERCIAL BREAKTHROUGH.

FINALLY, WE NOTE AN ENHANCED FRANKNESS AND CANDOR BETWEEN OUR OFFICERS AND THEIR GOA COUNTERPARTS. THIS SITUATION RESULTS IN PART FROM THE WARM ATMOSPHERE CREATED DURING 1976 BY HIGH-LEVEL VISITS (NAIM TO WASHINGTON AND KISSINGER TO KABUL). THE IMPROVED CLIMATE OF RELATIONSHIP HAS CONTRIBUTED TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES OF EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES AND OF ONGOING PROGRAMS. IT MAY HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THE GOA'S RECENT AND WELCOME "NEW LOOK" AT WHAT THE PEACE CORPS HAS TO OFFER AFGHANISTAN.

WE STILL HAVE PROBLEMS. WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS OF OUR DIALOGUE OVER MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND THE SUBSEQUENT
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AFGHAN VOTING RECORDS IN THE UN; THE AFGHANS ARE PROCRASTINATING OVER SETTLEMENT OF A MAJOR U.S. COMMERCIAL CLAIM; THE GOA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS DISCOURAGING; WE HAVE PROBLEMS IN AGREEING ON SELECTIONS OF PERSONS FOR OUR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS; THERE ARE SIGNS OF MINOR IRRITANTS IN AFGHAN/IRANIAN RELATIONS.

ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, THE U.S. BEGINS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH

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AFGHANISTAN IN 1977 WITH MAJOR U.S. OBJECTIVES ADVANCED OVER THE LAST YEAR. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE MONITORING OUR OWN AND AFGHAN PERFORMANCE IN THE COMING MONTHS TO TRY TO NURTURE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS AND DESIGN APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE NEGATIVE ONES -- BOTH EFFORTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPROPRIATE UNITED STATES LEVEL OF INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

THIS CABLE REPRESENTS THE VIEWS OF THE HEADS OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. MISSION AS WELL AS MY OWN. END SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION: AS HAS BEEN PAST PRACTICE, A POLICY REVIEW GROUP, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. MISSION, WAS ASKED THIS YEAR TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING EXAMINATION OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE RESOURCES BEING APPLIED TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THE REPORT WAS COMPLETED IN DECEMBER 1976, AND DISCUSSED WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS FROM JAN 7 - 11, 1977.

2. REVIEW GROUP CONCLUSIONS: THE REVIEW GROUP'S CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT THE OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED IN THE 1976 ASSESSMENT REMAIN VALID AND THAT PRESENT LEVELS OF U.S. RESOURCE INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN ARE SUFFICIENT TO MEET U.S. OBJECTIVES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS OF THE GROUP WERE IN THE FIELD OF FUTURE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS -- ESPECIALLY USAID AND THE NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT AREA -- AND IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
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PEACE CORPS. THE GROUP URGED THE COUNTRY TEAM TO CONTINUE TO STRESS IN USAID PROJECTS THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN AID'S FY 1975 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (DAP) WHICH EMPHASIZES SIMPLICITY; INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT; DIRECT BENEFITS TO THE POOR; OBJECTIVE AND OBSERVABLE RESULTS; A FIRM ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMITMENTS BEING MET BY THE AFGHANS AS A CONDITION OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 KABUL 468

LIMDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

WITH REGARD TO THE PEACE CORPS, THE REVIEW GROUP URGED MORE DIVERSIFICATION (ESPECIALLY AN END TO THE PREDOMINANCE OF ENGLISH TEACHING IN PEACE CORPS PROGRAMMING) INTO HEALTH, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND AGRICULTURE. THE GROUP PREPARED A SPECIAL ANNEX ON INTERNAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY SUPERVISION OF THE AFGHAN STAFF, IN PEACE CORPS MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW DIRECTOR (WHO ARRIVED JAN 1, 1977) AND RECOMMENDED THAT ALL PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER POSITIONS CAREFULLY BE SCRUTINIZED FOR EFFECTIVENESS -- NOT JUST ESTABLISHED TO HAVE A PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

IN THE NARCOTICS AREA, THE REVIEW GROUP GENERALLY ENDORSED THE U.S. MISSION NARCOTICS CONTROL PROPOSAL (76 KABUL 8764), BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO MUCH DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT AND INVESTMENT IN THE LONG-TERM EFFORT, URGING INSTEAD CHANNELING OF APPROPRIATE U.S. RESOURCE INPUT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP) AND THE UN FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL (UNFODAC).

IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES, THE REVIEW GROUP ENDORSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROGRAMS, BUT POINTED OUT
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THAT SELECTION PROBLEMS WE HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING REQUIRE

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CONTINUED ATTENTION IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE SELECTION OF QUALIFIED AFGHAN CANDIDATES.

IN THE AREAS OF MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS AND PURSUITS OF U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THE REVIEW GROUP SUGGESTED CONTINUATION OF PRESENT EFFORTS TO REPRESENT UNITED STATES INTERESTS. THE REVIEW GROUP DID NOT RECOMMEND PUNITIVE ACTIONS IF AMERICAN AND AFGHAN INTERESTS DO NOT COINCIDE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

THE REVIEW GROUP'S PAPER IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT AS KABUL A-6 OF JANUARY 19, 1977.

3. SUMMARY COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT: THE COUNTRY TEAM AND I HAVE EXAMINED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF 11 FAM 212.4, THIS YEAR'S REVIEW GROUP'S PAPER, NEA'S POLICY PAPER ON AFGHANISTAN (16 JULY 1976), AND LAST YEAR'S ASSESSMENT (76 KABUL 1765). WE FOUND THE REVIEW GROUP'S PAPER AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GROUP'S MEMBERS PROVOCATIVE AND USEFUL.

WE FIND THE PRESENT (FY 77) STAFFING AND RESOURCE INVESTMENT LEVEL OF THE U.S. GOVT IN AFGHANISTAN ADEQUATE TO FULFILL AMERICAN PRESENT AND PLANNED OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS HERE, DEA AS NOTED BELOW.

THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUING PROGRESS IN THE PAST YEAR IN THE AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP: A MAJOR COMMERCIAL CONTRACT (FUNDED WITH 50 MILLION DOLLARS OF IRANIAN MONEY) WAS OBTAINED BY AN AMERICAN COMPANY; THE GOVT OF AFGHANISTAN HAS EXPRESSED GREATER WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH US ON NARCOTICS PROBLEMS; THERE IS A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF AND APPRECIATION FOR AMERICAN AID -- NOTABLY SOME NEW INTEREST IN USE OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS; PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH TOP AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE BECOME CLOSER AND MORE CANDID.

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OUR REGIONAL OBJECTIVES HAVE ALSO BEEN FORWARDED. THE AFGHANS AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVE HAD TWO SUMMIT MEETINGS TO DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS AND HAVE ENDED THE BITTER PROPAGANDA INVECTIVE THAT PREVIOUSLY POISONED THE LOCAL AIRWAVES. WHILE NOT CLAIMING CREDIT FOR THIS HAPPY DEVELOPMENT, THE U.S. CAN CERTAINLY CELEBRATE THE LESSENING OF TENSION IN THE REGION THAT HAS RESULTED FROM PAK/AFGHAN DIPLOMACY.

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THE AFGHANS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEIR INTERNAL STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE AND TO HOLD THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LOCAL COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS AT ARMS LENGTH WITHOUT SEEMING TO CREATE ANY FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS IN MOSCOW ABOUT BASIC SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE AREA. AGAIN, IT WOULD BE FALSE TO ATTRIBUTE THIS WELCOME SITUATION DIRECTLY TO OUR POLICIES, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PRESENCE HERE IS AN IMPORTANT AID IN THE AFGHAN POLITICAL BALANCING ACT.

ON THE LESS POSITIVE SIDE, WE ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE RESULTS OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE GOA ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. ON THE ONE ISSUE (THE UN GUAM VOTE) WHERE WE WENT TO THE MAT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE AFGHANS IGNORED OUR VIGOROUS AND REPEATED DEMARCHES WHEN (IT SEEMED TO US HERE) THEY MIGHT HAVE RESPONDED AND ABSTAINED OR ABSENTED THEMSELVES FROM THE FINAL UN PLENARY VOTE WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THEIR "NON-ALIGNED" CREDENTIALS.

ALSO ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE AFGHANS ARE PROCRASTINATING OVER A DECISION TO SETTLE A MAJOR CLAIM OF A U.S. FIRM. IN GENERAL, GOA RELATIONS WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR (INCLUDING THEIR OWN) ARE NOT ENCOURAGING.

WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH OUR CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM (IVP). THE GOA REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE PROGRAM'S INVITATIONAL NATURE AND HAS TRIED TO FORCE A SELECTION PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT ENABLE IT TO

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DESIGNATE THE GRANTEEES. THE MISSION IS DETERMINED NOT TO SACRIFICE THE QUALITY OF THE PROGRAM AND IS WORKING WITH RESPONSIBLE GOA OFFICIALS TO FIND A SELECTION PROCEDURE WHICH IS RESPONSIVE TO AFGHAN CONCERNS AND AT THE SAME TIME PERMITS US TO ASSESS THE GRANTEE QUALIFICATIONS ADEQUATELY.

FINALLY, THERE ARE SMALL SIGNS OF STRAIN IN IRANIAN/AFGHAN RELATIONS, BUT WE THINK THAT THEY REFLECT MORE CULTURAL THAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND WILL NOT GET OUT OF HAND.

IT IS THE NURTURING OF THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS LISTED ABOVE AND DESIGNING APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH NEGATIVE ONES WHICH WILL OCCUPY THE ATTENTION OF THIS MISSION IN THE MONTHS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 KABUL 468

LIMDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

4. SPECIFIC COUNTRY TEAM COMMENTS ON CURRENT COUNTRY OBJECTIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REVIEW GROUP PAPER:

OBJECTIVE: TO FOSTER AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WILLING AND ABLE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE.

COMMENT: THE OBJECTIVE IS VALID. THE ENTIRE U.S. PRESENCE HERE SERVES THIS OBJECTIVE. THE REVIEW GROUP RECOMMENDED AND THE COUNTRY TEAM ENDORSED THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THE U.S. GOVT BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND IN A MODEST WAY OUR MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AFGHAN OFFICERS. WE WILL ALSO UNDERTAKE, UNDER USIS LEADERSHIP, A MORE CONCERTED EFFORT TO PUBLICIZE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

OBJECTIVE: TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER AFGHAN REGIONAL-TIES THROUGH THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN.

COMMENT: THE OBJECTIVE IS VALID. WE SHOULD SEEK TO DRAW INCREASING DISTINCTIONS AND SOPHISTICATION, HOWEVER, BETWEEN
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OUR APPROACHES TO ISLAMABAD AND TEHRAN ON AFGHAN MATTERS.

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FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUALITY OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN MAY PERMIT US TO INFLUENCE THE SHAH AND HIS GOVT TO PLAY A CONTINUING CREATIVE ROLE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE AFGHANS. IN ISLAMABAD, ON THE OTHER HAND, A POSTURE OF SYMPATHETIC CONCERN FOR GOOD REGIONAL RELATIONS, BUT NO PRESSURE ON THE PAKS TO ACT IN A PARTICULAR WAY TOWARDS THE AFGHANS WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE FOR U.S. INTERESTS.

OBJECTIVE: TO ASSIST AFGHANISTAN IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS THE QUALITY OF THE LIFE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE AFGHAM POPULACE.

COMMENT: IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF THEIR PAPER, THE POLICY REVIEW GROUP FELT THAT PRIORITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE PLACED ON PROJECTS MEETING THE CRITERIA OF THE USAID'S FY 1975 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (DAP). THE GROUP FURTHER ELABORATED THAT THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE A FUNCTION OF AFGHAM PERFORMANCE IN DAP-RELATED ACTIVITIES. BUT LATER IN THEIR REPORT A HARDER LINE IS TAKEN. U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE "... LIMITED TO PROJECTS THAT MEET A WELL-DEFINED CRITERIA OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO THE POOREST MAJORITY..."

THE COUNTRY TEAM AGREES THAT THE 1975 DAP CONTINUES TO BE A VALUABLE GUIDELINE FOR "DOING BUSINESS" IN AFGHANISTAN. IT NOTES ALSO, AND AGREES WITH, PREVIOUS WASHINGTON OBSERVATIONS THAT THIS PROCEDURAL GUIDE NEEDS TO BE REINFORCED WITH SEVERAL SECTORAL ASSESSMENTS WHICH ARE NEEDED TO FILL THE GAPS REQUIRED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE COUNTRY TEAM ALSO IS AWARE THAT USAID EXPERIENCE IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS UNDER THE FY 1975 DAP HAS SHOWN THAT AFGHAM ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES ARE OFTEN INSUFFICIENT, UNAIDED, TO MAKE COMPLETELY WORKABLE A "YOU PERFORM AND WE WILL RESPOND WITH SUPPORT" PROCEDURE. WITHOUT EXCEPTION, PROJECTS STARTED UNDER THE DAP STRATIGY, CONFIDENTIAL
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BECAUSE OF THESE WEAKNESSES, HAVE TAKEN LONGER TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT IN THEIR INITIAL STAGES THAN ANTICIPATED.

A REVISION OF THE PRESENT DAP, TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY USAID AFGHANISTAN DURING 1977, WILL REFLECT LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES, SUCH AS TECHNICAL SKILLS SHORTAGES

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(AND THEREFORE TRAINING NEEDS), AND PROJECT DESIGN/MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES (AND THEREFORE THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONAL ADVICE AS WELL AS TRAINING).

THE DAP REVISION ALSO WILL RECOGNIZE AND REFLECT THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE 1975 DAP IN FORCING AN INTIMATE TWO-WAY ENGAGEMENT, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME, BETWEEN BILATERAL DONOR AND THE AFGHAN GOVT. SUCH AN ENGAGEMENT HAS SHOWN THE NEED FOR CONSIDERATION OF PROJECTS WHICH FALL SHORT OF DIRECTLY BENEFITTING THE RURAL POPULATION, BUT WHICH ADDRESS BASIC AFGHAN WEAKNESSES WHICH HAVE TO BE OVERCOME IN ORDER TO REACH THIS ULTIMATE GOAL. SOME OF THE NEW PROJECTS WHICH USAID PROPOSES FOR FUNDING IN 1977 OR 1978 BEGIN OUR RESPONSES TO THESE LESSONS LEARNED. THE ATTEMPT, IN THESE PROJECTS, IS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOA MACHINERY TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT RURAL-DIRECTED PROGRAMS.

WITH RESPECT TO ANNUAL ASSISTANCE LEVELS, THE COUNTRY TEAM VIEW IS THAT YEAR-TO-YEAR AID LEVELS PER SE ARE NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTUAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITY VIS-A-VIS AFGHAN PERFORMANCE/NEEDS/EXPECTATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OVERALL STRATEGY. THE REVIEW GROUP VIEW IN THIS REGARD IS, THEREFORE, ACCEPTED AS VALID IN CONCEPT ALTHOUGH, ON BALANCE, THE COUNTRY TEAM JUDGES THE HISTORICAL ANNUAL AVERAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION DOLLARS HAS BEEN APPROPRIATE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND SHOULD BE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

WITH REGARD TO THE PEACE CORPS, WE FEEL THAT OUR STRATEGY OF THE PAST THREE YEARS -- KEEPING THE AFGHANS AWARE OF PEACE

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CORPS CAPABILITIES AND MAINTAINING A TRUNCATED PROGRAM WHILE NOT PRESSING THE GOA TO ACCEPT MORE VOLUNTEERS -- IS BEGINNING TO PAY OFF AS THE GOA IS REQUESTING NEW PEACE CORPS ASSISTANCE IN THE HEALTH FIELD AND IN ENGINEERING EDUCATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 KABL 468

LIMDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

OBJECTIVE: TO FOSTER A BROADER COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES INCLUDING AFGHAN APPRECIATION OF THE RELEVANCE OF AMERICAN VALUES -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL -- TO THEIR NATIONAL PROBLEMS.

COMMENT: THE REVIEW GROUP AND THE COUNTRY TEAM AGREE ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF AMERICAN STANDARDS IN SELECTING AFGHANS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS. BOTH THE REVIEW GROUP AND THE COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVE IT WOULD SERVE U.S. INTERESTS IF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS COULD BE EXPANDED PROVIDED PROGRAM STANDARDS ARE MAINTAINED.

OBJECTIVE: TO ENCOURAGE AN INCREASE IN AFGHAN UTILIZATION OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN UNDERTAKINGS FUNDED BY OPEC COUNTRIES AND OTHER DONORS, AND TO ENCOURAGE U.S.-AFGHAN INVESTMENT PROJECTS.

COMMENT: OBJECTIVE IS VALID. ONE MAJOR CONTRACT SIGNED IN 1976. OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS SEEM POSSIBLE IN 1977.

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OBJECTIVE: TO OBTAIN MORE FAVORABLE AFGHAN VOTES AT MULTI-

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LATERAL FORUMS ON ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY THE UNITED STATES.

COMMENT: THE COUNTRY TEAM AGREES WITH THE REVIEW GROUP THAT WE HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS WITH THIS OBJECTIVE. WE PLAN TO STUDY, IN COORDINATION WITH USUN, IO, AND NEA, WAYS IN WHICH OUR VIEWS CAN MORE FORCEFULLY BE BROUGHT TO THE GOA'S ATTENTION.

THE COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES THAT PUNITIVE MEASURES (E.G. CUTTING AID PROGRAMS) OVER UN VOTES WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS IN TERMS OF FUTURE AFGHAN UN VOTES.

OBJECTIVE: IN THE SHORT TERM, TO ASSIST THROUGH THE UN THE SUPPRESSION OF AFGHAN HEROIN PROCESSING POTENTIAL, THE DISRUPTION OF TRAFFICKING NETWORKS AND AN INCREASE IN SEIZURES OF OPIUM AND ITS DERIVATIVES; IN THE LONG TERM TO ENCOURAGE THE ERADICATION OF OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

COMMENT: THE REVIEW GROUP HAS ENDORSED THE PROPOSED ACTION PLAN SENT TO WASHINGTON AS 76 KABUL 8764. THE COUNTRY TEAM HAS TAKEN NOTE OF REVIEW GROUP CONCERN THAT UN AGENCIES PLAY AS LARGE A ROLE AS POSSIBLE AND THAT NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTIVITIES BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM USAID PROGRAMS. THERE IS A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DEA PERSONNEL, BUT FOR WHAT AND WHETHER PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY REQUIRES FURTHER STUDY (SEE KABUL 342, PARA 7).

5. CARRY-OVER ITEM: STYLE COMMITTEE REPORT: LAST YEAR'S ASSESSMENT REFLECTED CONTINUING CONCERN IN THE REVIEW GROUP AND THE COUNTRY TEAM ABOUT THE STYLE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE, SUCH AS SIZE AND LOCATION OF HOUSES AND SCOPE OF PRIVILEGES. THE CONCERN CENTERED ON WHETHER THE STYLE OF AMERICAN LIFE ADVERSELY AFFECTED U.S. OBJECTIVES.

A SPECIAL COMMITTEE COMPLETED A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JULY 1976. THE CONCLUSION OF THE REPORT WAS THAT HOUSING AND
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PRIVILEGES OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS ARE APPROPRIATE TO U.S. OBJECTIVES.

THE REPORT WAS CIRCULATED TO THE COUNTRY TEAM AND ITS CONCLUSION ENDORSED.

6. CONCLUSION: THIS YEAR'S ASSESSMENT REFLECTS A CONSENSUS

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AMONG ALL OF US HERE -- AFTER A SEARCHING INQUIRY -- THAT U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE MEETING THE TESTS OF TIME AND EXPERIENCE. THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION THIS YEAR WAS MORE ON TECHNIQUE THAN PRINCIPLE; MORE ON KINDS RATHER THAN LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE.

DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY SUPPORT FOR THIS MISSION CONTINUES AT A HIGH LEVEL. IN PARTICULAR, WE BELIEVE THAT HIGH-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN PROVIDING ESSENTIAL REASSURANCE TO THE AFGHANS OF CONTINUING AMERICAN INTEREST IN ASSURING AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE AND FLEXIBILITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH VISITS, WHICH WE HOPE WILL CONTINUE IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HELP TO CONVINCE THE AFGHANS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS IN GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH THEIR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THEREFORE CAUSE THE AFGHANS TO LISTEN MORE CAREFULLY WHEN WE PRESS THEM ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO US, FOR EXAMPLE WITH RESPECT TO THE UN, COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS OR NARCOTICS. THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK THAT SUCH VISITS CREATE AFGHAN EXPECTATIONS OF MORE AMERICAN AID, BUT WE BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN AND CAN BE CONTAINED SATISFACTORILY.
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